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INTRODUCTION 1
Contrary to a basic economic view that our behavior is driven by our preferences, 2 psychological studies have demonstrated that past behaviors (e.g., making a choice) can 3 also affect our preferences. The phenomenon of choice-induced preference change has been 4 traditionally demonstrated by the "free-choice paradigm" (e.g., Brehm, 1956) in which 5 individuals are first asked to rate several items for their preference, and then make choices 6 between pairs of equally attractive items (e.g., posters, CDs, etc.) so that they inevitably 7 have to reject items they may like. When asked to rate the same items a second time they 8 typically report increased preference for the items they chose and decreased preference for 9 the items they rejected. This phenomenon is usually explained as an effect of cognitive 10 dissonance. According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) , any inconsistency 11 between beliefs, preferences, or choices (e.g. not choosing a preferred item) results in an 12 aversive feeling (cognitive dissonance), that in turn motivates people to reconcile the 13 inconsistency (e.g., to justify their past behavior by changing their preference). 2010). However, these neuroimaging results still left it unknown whether the pMFC 19 activity merely reflects an epiphenomenon of cognitive dissonance such as passive 20 emotional reactions to inconsistency, or whether it plays a more active role in inducing 21 preference change to resolve inconsistency . 22 In the present study, we attempted to answer this question of causality by using 1-Hz 23 25 -min repetitive TMS (rTMS) to temporarily downregulate neuronal activity within pMFC 24 to test whether this reduces the cognitive dissonance effect. In order to measure 25 choice-induced preference change, we employed a modified free-choice paradigm using a 26 "choice-blindness" procedure (Johansson et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013) ; 27 see Methods for details). This procedure controls for an important artifact inherent in the 28 sufficiently low (3 out of 26 participants). 23
In the present study, participants performed the four following tasks in fixed order; 1) 24 First Rating task, 2) Choice task, 3) Second Rating task, and 4) Memory task. Because our 25 prior fMRI study demonstrated pMFC activation in response to the discrepancy between 26 behavior and attitude during the Second Rating task (Izuma et al., 2010) , the rTMS 27 treatment was administered right before participants performed the Second Rating tasks (an 28 off-line rTMS approach). After completing the Second Rating task, all the participants took 29 8 a 35-40 min break before the Memory task, to ensure that the effects of TMS had subsided 1 before continuing. 2
In the First Rating Task, participants were presented with images serially and were 3 instructed to rate how much they liked each image by using an 8-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 8 = very much) labeled on the keyboard. There was no time limit, but participants were 5 encouraged to give their first impression. The inter-trial interval was 1 second. 6
In the Choice task, images were presented in pairs, and participants were asked to 7 indicate the image they preferred in each trial by using a computer mouse with their right 8 hand. Thus, participants made 25 binary choices in total (50 images). There were 4 9 experimental conditions during the Choice task; 1) Switch trials (5 trials), 2) No-switch 10 trials (5 trials), 3) Computer trials (5 trials), and 4) Other trials (10 trials; not included in 11 preference change analysis). 12
While the 25 pairs were fixed among all participants, which pairs were used in each of 13 the four conditions (Swtich, No-Swtich, Computer and Other) in the Choice task was 14 determined based on each participant's rating during the First Rating task. Before the 15
Choice task, 15 image-pairs (30 images) used in the Switch, No-Switch and Computer trials 16 were automatically matched by a Matlab program in terms of the difference in the first 17 ratings between two images in each pair. As discussed previously (Chen and Risen, 2010; 18 Izuma and Murayama, 2013), the strength of the artifact in the traditional free choice 19 paradigm depends on the rating difference between two images in a choice pair (i.e., the 20 smaller the within-pair rating difference, the bigger the preference change by the artifact). 21
Moreover, pairs with larger difference in the first ratings were preferentially allocated to the 22 three conditions used in analysis. This was done to induce stronger cognitive dissonance 23 (i.e., larger discrepancy between preference and choice) in the Switch condition. That is, 24 assuming that participants choose the image from a pair with the higher first rating most of 25 the time, when their choice is reversed by the switch manipulation, they would believe that 26 they chose the image they disliked and did not choose the image they liked. The remaining 27 20 images were assigned to the Other condition and excluded from preference change 28 analysis because items in the Other trials were not matched on within-pair rating difference. 29 9 Thus the comparisons between the Other vs. the three critical conditions would not be 1 informative. Although not used in the analyses, these additional 20 images were necessary 2 in order to have more options from which we chose 15 pairs for the three critical conditions 3 that were sufficiently matched on the within-pair difference. 4
In each trial of the Switch condition, participants were first asked to click the "Start" 5 button located on the left side of the screen (Figure 1a , stage 1). As soon as they clicked the 6 button, two images and two boxes (a yellow box on the top and a blue box on the bottom, 7 both of which were aligned with each of two images) appeared on the screen (Figure 1a , 8 stage 2). Participants were asked to look at each of the two images carefully and to move 9 the mouse cursor to the box corresponding to the image they preferred. For example, if they 10 preferred the image on the top, they moved the cursor to the yellow box. The two images 11 remained on the screen until a preference was indicated, or for a maximum of 3 seconds. If 12 the participants did not decide after 3 seconds, the two images disappeared, and participants 13 then had to make their choice from memory. 14 As soon as the cursor touched one of the two boxes, the screen automatically changed, 15 and participants performed 4 trials of a flanker task (Figure 1a , stage 3), which was 16 intended to distract participants' memory for the locations of the two images. During 17 instructions, the Choice task was referred to as the "choice and attention" task, and each 18 participant was told that the task was intended to test decision-making and attention at the 19 same time, providing an explanation for the flanker task. During the four trials of the 20 flanker task, there were always 2 congruent (">>>>>" or "<<<<<") and 2 incongruent 21 ("<<><<" or ">><>>") trials, and participants were asked to answer the direction of a 22 central target arrow (left or right). Participants responded by pressing one of two keys 23 labeled on the keyboard with their left hand (index and middle fingers), and were told that 24 they would get one point every time they responded accurately within 1 second. They were 25 encouraged to try to get at least 60 points (out of 100) in total and aim for 80 points if 26 possible. There was no monetary incentive for the task. Stimuli were presented once every 27 second (0.5 seconds for stimulus presentation plus 0.5 seconds for inter-stimulus interval). to the box corresponding to the image they preferred (e.g., a yellow box if they preferred the image on the 7 top). After performing 4 trials of the Flanker task that serves as a distractor (stage 3), they were asked to click 8 the image on the screen (stage 4; presumably the one they preferred at stage 2). Note that the locations of two 9 images were switched between stages 2 and 4 only during a Switch trial so that the participants were led to 10 believe that they had chosen the image they actually preferred less than the alternative. Each image of Switch After the flanker task (5 seconds in total), the screen showed only one image, which 18 was presumably the one they had preferred before the flanker task, along with the start 19 button and the box touched by the participants (Figure 1a , stage 4). Finally, participants 20 were instructed to click the image on the screen (presumably the one they had preferred), 21 11 and the image was highlighted by a light blue square for 1.5 seconds. Unknown to the 1 participants, during the Switch trials, the locations of two images were switched after the 2 flanker task so that they were led to believe that they had chosen the image they actually 3 preferred less than the alternative (i.e., the image that was not preferred at the stage 2 of the 4
Choice task) The switch manipulation always occurred on 5th, 10th, 16th, 20th, and 24th 5 trials. No participant reported the switches during the task, but 4 of them reported it during 6 the post-experimental interview (see below). 7
In the No-switch trials (and Other trials), the task proceeded in the same way except 8 that no switch was made ( Figure 1b , stage 4). In the Computer trials, the words 9 "Computer's choice" were displayed above the start button at the beginning of the trial 10 ( Figure 1c , stage 1). After clicking the start button, two images and two boxes were 11 displayed on the screen just like other trials. However, the participants were asked to wait 12 for a computer to choose one of two images. After 1 second, the computer's choice (red 13 arrows) was displayed on the screen (see Figure 1c , stage 2), and the participants were 14 asked to simply move the cursor to the box (thus the wallpaper) selected by a computer. 15
The rest of the task proceeded in the same way as No-switch and Other trials, and no switch 16 manipulation was introduced during the Computer trials. 17
Importantly, unknown to the participants, each computer trial occurred shortly after 18 each of the Switch trials (specifically, the Computer trials always occurred on 6th, 12th, 19 17th, 22nd, and 25th trials), and by doing so, the Computer's choice automatically 20 mimicked the participant's choice made in a previous Switch trial in terms of consistency 21 between their first preference rating and choice (note that more specifically, "choice" here 22 refers to participant's preference revealed at the stage 2 of the Choice task). That is, suppose 23 a participant was presented with two images that were rated 5 and 7 on the 8-point scale 24 during the First Preference Rating task. Typically, they prefer the image with a higher first 25 rating (i.e., the one rated 7) during the stage 2 of the Choice task. However, since behavior 26 is noisy, occasionally they would prefer the image with a lower rating (i.e., the one rated 5) 27
during the stage 2 of the Choice task. Because this behavior is known to contribute to an 28 important artifact (Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma and Murayama, 2013), the computer trials 29 were programmed to select the image with a lower first rating whenever the participant 1 preferred (i.e., based on their action in the stage 2 of Figure 1 ) the image with a lower first 2 rating in a previous Switch trial. Similarly, the computer selected the image with a higher 3 first rating when the participant preferred the image with a higher first rating in a previous 4
Switch trial. The order of No-switch and Other trials was randomly determined. 5
At the end of the Choice task, each of the 30 images used in the Switch, No-switch and 6
Computer trials was categorized into the 6 conditions (5 images each) depicted in Figure 1  7 (images A-F). Based on participant's action during the stage 2 of the Switch and No-switch 8 trials, each image was categorized as either "preferred" or "unpreferred." Similarly, based 9 on participant's final choice during the stage 4, each image was categorized as either 10 "chosen" or "unchosen." Because of the switch manipulation, preference and choice are 11 inconsistent in the Switch condition (e.g., preferred-unchosen or unpreferred-chosen). Thus, 12 the choice-blindness paradigm makes it possible to dissociate the effect of choice from the 13 effect of preference. 14 After the completion of the Choice task, the participants were escorted to the TMS 15 room where rTMS was administered as described below. Immediately after rTMS, the 16 participants were asked to perform the Second Rating task in the TMS room. All 17 participants started the task within 2 min of the TMS completion. 18
The Second Rating task was similar to the first one, with the exception that the images 19 were now accompanied with information from the choices the participants had previously 20 made (as similarly done in the previous fMRI study; (Izuma et al., 2010) . Below each 21 image, they were presented with the information about whether they (or a computer) had 22 chosen or unchosen the image during the Choice task (e.g., "You chose this picture," 23 "Computer rejected this picture," etc.). For items in the Switch condition, this information 24
was based on what participants believed to have chosen at the stage 4 of the Choice task 25 ( Figure 1 ). More specifically, those images clicked on after the Flanker task in the stage 4 26 were accompanied with "You chose this picture," whereas alternative images were 27 accompanied with "You rejected this picture." This information was intended to make the 28 effect of cognitive dissonance stronger by making the discrepancy between attitude and 29 13 past behavior salient. It should be noted that because of the explicit information, preference 1 change found in the present study should if anything be inflated. However, the aim of the 2 present study is not to find a minimum condition for choice-induced preference change to 3
occur, but to test the effect of TMS on pMFC when it does occur (see the paper by (Salti et  4 al., 2014) that formally tests the effect of this explicit information). The participants were 5 told that this information about their past choices was related to a task they were going to 6 perform afterwards, but not related to the rating task, and they were asked to focus on 7
reporting their preference for each image one more time. As was in the First Rating task, 8 they rated the same 50 images using the 8-point scale. 9
After the Second Rating task, the participants were also asked to answer the Positive 10 and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) questionnaire (10 items each for positive and 11 negative moods) (Watson et al., 1988 ) by using an 8-point scale to measure if different 12 rTMS conditions had differential effect on their mood. All the participants finished the 13 Second Rating task and the PANAS questionnaire within 8 min after the TMS, thus 14
presumably well under the influence of the 25-min rTMS (e.g., see Bruckner et al., 2013) . 15
After completing the questionnaire, they took a 35-40 min break in the original 16 experimental room to ensure the effects of the TMS had subsided before continuing. 17
After the break, the participants completed the Memory task. Importantly, the Memory 18 task was completely unanticipated by the participants, and they did not know that memory 19 about their past choices would be tested later on. During the task, they were presented 20 images serially (as in the first and second rating tasks) and were instructed to answer 21 whether they "chose" or "rejected" (i.e., unchosen) the item during the Choice task by 22
pressing one of two keys on the keyboard. They were instructed that images presented in 23 the Computer trials of the Choice task would not be presented. Consequently, a total of 40 24 images were presented during the task. They were also asked to make best guess if they 25
were not certain. 26
The Memory task was intended to test whether the rTMS had any differential effect on 27 the participants' ability to retrieve memory about their past choices. Although during the 28 Second Rating task, the participants' past choice for each presented image was explicitly 29 displayed, if the participants were able to remember their (correct) indicated preferences in 1 the Switch trials, then the intended effect of cognitive dissonance induced by discrepancy 2 between behavior and attitude would have been likely to be reduced. It should be noted that 3 during the Memory task, the correct response was defined based on participants' action at 4 the stage 2 of the Choice task. Accordingly, if the switch manipulation was successful, and 5 participants believed the explicit information about their past choice during the Second 6
Rating task, memory performance for the Switch condition should be lower than that for 7 the Non-switch condition (e.g., they mistakenly remember that they chose the item which 8 they actually did not prefer at the stage 2 due to the switch manipulation). 9
After finishing the Memory task, participants were asked to complete the Preference for 10 the participants were asked the three following questions during the post-experimental 16 interview to ensure that they did not detect our critical switch manipulation; "Do you have 17 any comments on the experiment?", "Do you find anything strange with the wallpaper 18 stimuli during the tasks?", "Some participants mentioned that during some trials of the 19 Choice task, the locations of two images changed. Do you think it happened to you?" The 20 three questions were asked always in this order of increasing specificity. Four participants 21 reported in response to the last question that the switch happened to them also, and thus 22 they were excluded from the analyses. All the remaining participants showed no sign of 23 detection. 24
25

TMS procedures 26
In order to downregulate the activity in pMFC, we employed 1-Hz repetitive TMS 27 (rTMS). rTMS is a non-invasive technique that can produce after-effects on cortical 28 15 excitability, and a low frequency (e.g., 1-Hz) rTMS is known to decrease cortical 1 excitability in stimulated areas (Ridding and Rothwell, 2007) . Each participant received 2 1-Hz rTMS for 25 minutes. According to previous reports (e.g. Bruckner et al., 2013) , the 3 after effect of the 25-min 1-Hz rTMS is considered to last 20 min or more. A Magstim 4
Super Rapid with a 70mm air-cooled figure-8 coil was used. 5
The experimenter administering TMS was blind to the task and study design except for 6 knowledge of the three stimulation conditions, and was in the same room as the participants 7 only during the TMS phase and an initial portion of the Second Rating task. The 8 experimenter administering the participants' tasks was absent during TMS positioning and 9 delivery, and not informed of the TMS condition until after the completion of the 10 experiment. Participants were blind to the study's intent, but were aware of the possibility 11 that they could be receiving either real or sham stimulation, and that real stimulation would 12 be expected to lower the level of brain activity in the area under the coil for up to 30 13 minutes after the end of stimulation. 14 The intensity of the TMS was set for each participant at 80% of the participant's active 15 motor threshold. To determine threshold, we first adjusted the TMS coil location and 16 orientation to maximize the EMG magnitude in tibialis anterior from single pulse 17 stimulation. The participant was then asked to steadily contract the muscle with moderate 18 intensity. Starting from 50% output, the stimulator was adjusted in 5% steps to find the 19 minimum intensity at which single-pulse TMS elicited a liminal EMG for 3 out of 4 stimuli. 20
The main rTMS treatment was conducted at 80% of this value. 21
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three TMS groups; 1) pMFC, 2) Our main analysis is based on the 2 (Preference; preferred or unpreferred) X 2 (Switch; 10 switch or no switch) X 3 (TMS group; pMFC, sham-pMFC, or PPC) mixed design with 11 preference change (second preference ratings minus first preference ratings) as a dependent 12 variable. It should be noted that in our choice-blindness paradigm, a choice-induced 13 preference change is indicated by a significant 2 (Preference; preferred or unpreferred) X 2 14 (Switch; switch or no switch) interaction. This 2 X 2 interaction indicates that preference 15
change depends on what the participants believed about past choices they had made 16 previously. Regardless of their initial relative preferences of two images as revealed in the 17 stage 2 of the Choice task ( Figure 1 ) (preferred or unpreferred), preferences for the images 18 should increase when participants believed that they had chosen the image (i.e., the 19 preferred-No-switch condition and the unpreferred-Switch condition), while preferences for 20 images should decrease when images were thought to have been unchosen (i.e., the 21 preferred-Switch condition and the unpreferred-No-switch condition). No-switch conditions across the three TMS groups. Note that "Preferred" and "Unpreferred" (x-axis) are 12 based on participant's relative preferences of paired images, which was revealed during the Stage 2 of the 13 Choice task (Figure 1 ). 14 
15
In order to further probe the significant 3-way interaction, 3 separate two-way 16 (Preference X Choice) repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted for each TMS group. 17
This revealed a significant Preference X Choice interaction in the sham-pMFC group (F (1,16) 18 = 16.36, p < 0.001; Figure 3b ) and in the PPC group (F (1,17) = 7.73, p = 0.013; Figure 3c ). 19
As stated earlier, this 2-way interaction indicates the existence of choice-induced 20 preference change and indicates that preference change depends on what the participants 21 believed about past choices they had made previously regardless of their initial relative 22 preferences of two images (preferred or unpreferred). We further conducted two-sample 1 t-tests comparing switch vs. no-switch conditions in each of the preferred and unpreferred 2 conditions for the sham-pMFC and PPC groups. The results revealed that the difference 3 between the switch vs. no-switch conditions were all significant (p < 0.006) except for the 4 unpreferred condition of the PPC group (p = 0.21). In contrast, the same 2-way interaction 5 was not significant for the pMFC group (F (1,16) = 1.30, p = 0.27, n.s.) (Figure 3a) . 6
Two-sample t-tests comparing switch vs. no-switch conditions in each of the preferred and 7 unpreferred conditions for the pMFC group revealed that there was no significant 8 difference in both preferred and unpreferred conditions (p > 0.45). Thus, rTMS to the 9 pMFC region significantly reduced choice-induced preference change. 10
In order to test whether TMS had any effect on preference change for the items 11 presented in the Computer condition, we conducted 2 (Computer's choice; chosen or 12 unchosen) X 3 (TMS group) mixed ANOVA. It revealed a significant main effect of 13
Computer's choice (F (1,49) = 7.65, p = 0.008). However, a main effect of TMS group and a 14 2-way interaction were not significant (ps > 0.18), indicating that TMS had no influence on 15 preference change following choices made by the computer. As seen in Figure 4 , across all 16 three TMS groups, participants' preference for the items chosen by computer decreased, 17 while their preference for the items unchosen by computer increased. This result seems to 18 suggest the existence of a significant regression-to-the-mean effect. Since the computer's 19 choice was matched with participant's choice made in the Switch condition, the items 20 chosen by the computer were more likely to have higher first preference ratings. 21 Accordingly, participant's preference rating for the items chosen by the computer is more 22 likely to decrease during the second rating task due to the regression-to-the-mean effect 23 compared to the items unchosen by computer. 
Effect Size Analysis 5
In order to compute the size of the TMS effect on choice-induced preference change, we 6 computed a single preference change score as described in Method. One-way ANOVA on 7 this score comparing across the three TMS groups revealed a marginally significant effect of 8 TMS (F (2, 49) = 2.56, p = 0.088). Because there was no significant difference in mean 9 preference change scores between two control conditions (the sham-pMFC and PPC groups, 10 p = 0.28), we combined these two control groups in order to calculate Cohen's d. A 11 two-sample t-test comparing the pMFC group with this combined control group revealed a 12 significant difference (t (50) = 1.93, p = 0.03), and the calculation of Cohen's d revealed a 13 moderate effect size of the TMS (d = 0.59). 14
15
Control Analyses 16
We tested whether the rTMS had any effect on 1) participants' general attention level as 17 indexed by reaction times (RTs) during the First and Second Rating tasks, 2) mood as 18 measured by PANAS, and 3) memory about past choices. 19 A 2 (Rating task; first or second) X 3 (TMS group) mixed ANOVA on RTs revealed no 20 significant main effects or interaction (ps > 0. 15 ), suggesting that the rTMS did not affect 21 participants' attention level during the Second Rating task, which they performed 22 immediately after the rTMS. Regardless of the TMS groups, average RT (including all 50 1 trials) during the First Rating task was 2.17 sec (SD = 0.80), while average RT during the 2 Second Rating task was 2.07 sec (SD = 0.70). 3 Two 1 X 3 (TMS group) ANOVAs on positive and negative mood of the PANAS score 4 revealed no significant effect of the rTMS (ps > 0.34), indicating that the rTMS did not 5 alter participants' mood. 6 A 2 (Switch; switch or no-switch) X 3 (TMS group) mixed ANOVA on memory about 7 past choices revealed a significant main effect of the switch manipulation (F (1,49) = 4.14, p = 8 0.047). Because, in the Switch condition, the participants were led to believe that they 9 chose the image they preferred less than the alternatives, their memory performances were 10 significantly lower than those in the No-switch condition. Regardless of the TMS group, 11 average memory performance of the Non-switch condition was 58.5 % (SD = 13.6), which 12 was significantly higher than the chance level (50 %; t (51) = 4.48, p < 0.001), whereas 13 average memory performance of the Switch condition was 47.9 % (SD = 16.4), which did 14 not differ significantly from the chance level (p = 0.36). This result suggests that our switch 15 manipulation was successful, and participants continued to believe that they had chosen the 16 images they actually preferred less than alternatives and had not chosen the images they 17 preferred more than alternatives. A main effect of the TMS group and a 2-way interaction 18
were not significant (ps > 0.77), suggesting that our main results reported above cannot be 19 explained by differential memory about past choices across the three TMS groups. 20
Finally, we also checked whether 1) within-pair rating difference and 2) the 21 preference-choice consistency were successfully matched across the three experimental 22 conditions (Switch, No-switch and Computer) during the Choice task as we intended. 23 interaction (ps > 0.19). 28 23 Second, participants generally chose images that had higher first preference rating when 1 they had a chance to make a choice themselves (i.e., the Switch and No-switch conditions). 2
The mean preference-choice consistency (all TMS group combined, n = 52) in the 3
No-switch condition was 62.9%, and it was 65.0% in the Switch condition and the 4
Computer condition (as previously described, the preference-choice consistency was 5 matched between these two conditions by the task program). A 3 (experimental conditions; 6
Switch, No-switch, or Computer) X 3 (TMS group; pMFC, sham-pMFC, or PPC) mixed 7 ANOVA revealed no significant main effect or interaction (ps > 0.66). 8
Taken together, these results indicate that the main findings reported above is highly 9 unlikely to be explained by the different level of the artifact (Chen and Risen, 2010) across 10 three TMS groups. 11
12
Preference for Consistency Scale 13
Finally, we conducted 1 X 3 (TMS group) between-participant ANOVA on the 14 preference for consistency scale. It revealed no significant effect (p = 0.54), suggesting that 15 individual difference in the tendency to prefer consistency was no different across the three 16 TMS groups. 17
We also investigated, as exploratory analyses, whether participants' preference for 18 consistency scores were related to their level of choice-induced preference change, 19 separately for each TMS group. We used the same single preference change score described 20 above to index an individual's tendency to justify choices they made. Although correlations 21 in all 3 groups did not reach statistical significance largely due to our limited sample size, 22
sham-pMFC and PPC groups tended to show positive correlation (sham-pMFC r (15) = 0.27, 23 p = 0.15; PPC r (16) = 0.32, p = 0.10). In contrast, correlation in the pMFC group was 24 virtually zero (r (15) = 0.03, p = 0.46). The present study demonstrated that choice-induced preference change was 2 significantly reduced by TMS over the pMFC region compared to the control conditions 3 (TMS to the PPC region and sham-TMS to the pMFC region), providing the evidence that 4 the pMFC plays a causal role in inducing preference change following inconsistency 5 between choice and preference. It is important to note that we used a modified 6 choice-blindness paradigm to control for the artifact inherent in the traditional free-choice 7 paradigm (Chen and Risen, 2010). Thus, unlike a number of previous behavioral as well as 8 neuroimaging studies that used the original paradigm (see Izuma and Murayama, 2013) , the 9 present study provides unequivocal evidence for the existence of choice-induced preference 10 change and the effect of TMS over different brain regions on the phenomenon. 11
The present findings are consistent with the previous studies showing that the pMFC 12 plays a causal role in inducing behavioral or attitude change following a variety of aversive 13 experiences in both social and non-social contexts. The pMFC is known to be activated by 14 a variety of aversive outcomes (Shackman et al., 2011) . Furthermore, some neurons in 15 pMFC do not simply respond to negative outcomes per se, rather these neurons respond to 16 negative outcome (e.g., reduced reward) only when the monkey subsequently changed their 17 behavior from the previous trial (Shima and Tanji, 1998) . There exist similar neurons in the 18 human dorsal anterior cingulate regions, and ablation of this area significantly impaired 19 participants' performance in a reward-based movement selection task especially when they 20 had to change their movement after reduced reward (Williams et al., 2004) . Recently, fMRI 21 studies found that the same region is activated by aversive experiences in social contexts 22 (for a review, Izuma, 2013) , such as disagreeing with others (Klucharev et al., 2009 ; Izuma 23 and Adolphs, 2013), or agreeing with people we dislike (Izuma and Adolphs, 2013). 24 It should be noted that the preference change observed in the present study could be 27 explained by self-perception theory (Bem, 1967) . Self-perception theory posits that just like 28 we came to know another person's preference by observing their behavior, we infer our 29 27 own preference by observing our own behavior (e.g., I must like it because I chose it). This 1 limitation is inherent in all past studies demonstrating choice-induced preference change, 2 and Greenwald even argued that these two theories cannot be distinguished (Greenwald, 3 1975 (Greenwald, 3 , 2012 . Although not conclusive, our present TMS study along with the previous 4 fMRI study (Izuma et al., 2010) seem to support cognitive dissonance theory. In our 5 previous fMRI study, the degree of cognitive dissonance is quantified as the discrepancy 6 between a participant's past choice and preference for the item, and we found that activity 7 in the pMFC correlated with this parameter. Since this parameter is irrelevant to 8 self-perception theory, being able to reduce choice-induced preference change by 9 stimulating the pMFC with TMS suggests that dissonance reduction processes played a 10 major role in the present study. But, we admit that the fact that our data is consistent with 11 one theory does not necessarily mean that the other theory plays no role (i.e., consistency 12 fallacy). Nonetheless, the present study highlights the potential of cognitive neuroscience 13 methods (fMRI, TMS) in distinguishing two social psychological theories. For example, we 14 can test whether different brain regions are activated by psychological processes assumed 15 in cognitive dissonance theory vs. self-perception theory. If activated regions are reliably 16 different, we can further test whether TMS to those regions could reduce choice-induced 17 preference change . 18 In summary, the present study demonstrated that TMS to the pMFC could reduce 19 choice-induced preference change. Our results inform neural models of the choice 20 justification processes implemented by the pMFC and provide a clear demonstration of the 21 causal role of the pMFC. It will be most important in future studies to sharpen our 22 understanding of this causal role by providing direct comparisons among different types of 23 conflict, and to link the role of the pMFC to that of other brain regions with which it is 24 connected. 25 26 
